FLCS No. 120: Week Ending December 18, 2009

The Court of Appeals released one published opinion this week, which affirmed the district court's award of temporary, rather than permanent, maintenance (Maiers v. Maiers). The Court of Appeals also issued three unpublished decisions, including cases affirming property division (Koehnen v. Koehnen), reversing denial of a third-party custody motion (Nelson v. Brown), and affirming property division while remanding a maintenance issue (Duncan v. Duncan).

Supreme Court Opinions (0)

The Minnesota Supreme Court did not release any opinions this week related to family law matters.

Court of Appeals Opinions (4)

• Maiers v. Maiers Appellant-wife argued that the district court abused its discretion by ordering respondent-husband to pay temporary, rather than permanent, maintenance. The appellate court found no error, and affirmed. (Washington County, Judge Gregory G. Galler)
  
  During the parties’ seventeen-year marriage, respondent worked in computer science and appellant was primarily a homemaker, though she worked part-time on several occasions. Appellant is a licensed teacher and has also worked as a flight attendant. Upon dissolution, the district court stated that is was uncertain about when appellant would be able to be self-supporting. The district ordered respondent to pay temporary maintenance for five years, and reserved the issue for a later assessment of respondent’s self-sufficiency.
  
  On appeal, appellant argued that the district court should have granted her permanent maintenance because it expressed uncertainty about her financial future. The appellate court disagreed, explaining that the district court did not express doubt about whether appellant could be self-sufficient, but when she would become self-sufficient. In light of appellant’s education and work opportunities, the district court’s decision to award temporary maintenance and review the arrangement later was within the district court’s discretion.

  Full Opinion

• Duncan v. Duncan (Unpublished) Appellant-wife contested the district court’s property division, temporary maintenance award, and refusal to grant her attorneys’ fees in her divorce from respondent-husband. The appellate court largely affirmed, but remanded the maintenance issue for a finding of whether appellant could eventually become self-supporting. (Dakota County, Judge Shawn M. Moynihan)
  
  The parties gambled frequently during their twenty-four-year marriage. They also incurred a large amount of debt by living beyond their means. Appellant worked part-time as a cashier and respondent worked in real estate, largely with a LLC that he and his sons owned. During the parties’ marriage, appellant conveyed assets to the LLC. In its dissolution judgment, the district court divided the parties’ debt and awarded respondent with temporary maintenance. The district court denied appellant’s motion for attorneys’ fees.
  
  On appeal, appellant first argued that the district court abused its discretion by assigning approximately half of the parties’ debt to her. The appellate court disagreed, finding that even if respondent’s gambling was largely the source of debt, appellant benefited from the parties’ lifestyle during the marriage and could reasonably be responsible for helping repay the debt associated with it. Appellant next argued that the district court should have awarded her with permanent, rather than temporary, maintenance. The appellate court remanded this issue because the district court did not state whether appellant was expected to become self-supporting. Finally, appellant argued that the district court abused its discretion by declining to award her with attorneys’ fees. The appellate court disagreed, finding that need-based fees were inappropriate based on the implicit finding of respondent’s inability to pay, and denial of conduct-based fees was within the district court’s discretion.

  Full Opinion

• Koehnen v. Koehnen (Unpublished) Appellant-husband challenged the district court’s decision ordering him to pay the expenses associated with respondent-wife’s townhome. The appellate court affirmed because the district court did not abuse its discretion or clearly err in interpreting the contractual language. (Dakota County, Judge Rex D. Stacey)
  
  Respondent received the townhome in question in the judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage. About ten years after dissolution, appellant induced respondent to transfer the townhome to him via a quit claim deed. Appellant then moved to evict respondent, and respondent counter-claimed that appellant fraudulently induced her to transfer the townhome. The district court found for respondent and granted her a “rent free life estate in the subject property.” Respondent then moved to enforce or clarify the judgment, as the parties disagreed on the meaning of the term “rent free life estate.” The district court clarified that appellant was to pay the expenses associated with the townhome, such as mortgage payments, property taxes, and utility bills.
  
  On appeal, appellant first argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to interpret the phrase “rent free life estate” to include the abovementioned expenses. The appellate court disagreed, affirming that the phrase was ambiguous, and that respondent had timely filed and properly raised the issue. Appellant next argued that the district court clearly erred in interpreting the phrase “rent free life estate.” The appellate court again disagreed, finding that the district court was in the best position to interpret its own original judgment.

  Full Opinion

• Nelson v. Brown (Unpublished) Appellant-maternal grandparents disputed the district court’s decision that they lacked standing to seek child custody as interested third parties. The appellate court reversed and remanded because the district court held appellants to an inappropriately high standard of proof at this stage in the proceedings. (Hennepin County, Judge Susan Robiner)
  
  Respondent was previously adjudicated the father of the child in question. As part of this adjudication, the district court granted respondent and the child’s mother joint legal custody, and awarded the child’s mother with sole physical custody subject to respondent’s parenting time. For unclear reasons, respondent did not exercise his parenting time and the child’s mother left the child with appellants. Appellants previously received an order for temporary legal and physical custody, but the district court denied appellants’ request for permanent custody on grounds that appellants were not interested third parties under Minn. Stat. § 257C.01. Respondent moved for parenting time assistance, or alternatively, change in custody. Respondent served appellants, but appellants declined involvement based on the prior court order stating that appellants were not interested third parties. Appellants moved to intervene in respondent’s lawsuit and for custody. The district court permitted appellants to intervene, but denied their motion for third-party custody because appellants did not present clear and convincing evidence of any of the three child endangerment factors in Minn. Stat. § 257C.03 subd. 7(a).
  
  On appeal, appellants argued that the district court erred by refusing to allow their motion for third-party custody. The appellate court agreed, finding that under Minn. Stat. § 257C.03 subd. 7(a), the proper procedure was to allow appellants to attempt to make out a prima facie case for custody by a preponderance of the evidence. The prima facie showing is then followed with an evidentiary hearing, where evidence is judged under a clear and convincing standard. The appellate court reversed and remanded for the proper procedure to be followed.

  Full Opinion